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There is much criticism
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as to whether a trial judge or jury could

properly apply a standard calling for such generalized definitions as:
average person, community standards, dominant theme as a whole, and
prurient interest. Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, asserts a solution
to these criticisms when he states that the question whether a particular
work is obscene involves not really an issue of fact but a question of
constitutional judgment of the most sensitive and delicate kind. He
illustrates this contention most persuasively:
"Many juries might find that Joyce's 'Ulysses' or Bocaccio's
'Decameron' was obscene, and yet the conviction of a defendant
for selling either book would raise, for me, the gravest constitutional problems, for no such verdict could convince me,
without more, that these books are 'utterly without redeeming
social importance.'
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Military Law: Coercion and Duress as a Defense to Collaborating with the Enemy- Lieutenant Colonel Harry Fleming was
captured by the Chinese Communist forces near the Yalu River in
North Korea in October 1950. He was held as a prisoner of war in
various prison camps in North Korea. Upon his return to the United
States he was court martialed. The charge against Fleming was that
he, while a prisoner of war, did willfully, unlawfully and knowingly
collaborate, communicate and hold intercourse directly with the enemy
by joining with, participating in, and leading discussion groups and
classes reflecting views and opinions that the United Nations and the
United States were illegal aggressors in the Korean conflict, and by
participating in the preparation and making communist propaganda
recordings designed to promote disloyalty and disaffection among the
United States troops, by praising the enemy and attacking the war
aims of the United States. The charge was substantiated by the
evidence.
The evdence also showed the pressure and privation which the
prisoner Fleming had to endure. Immediately before his capture he
was wounded about the back and legs. For ten days after his capture
he was given no food or water. He was forced to march seventy miles
to the prison camp in that condition, and during that time he was frequently questioned. Each time he refused to answer he was physically
abused by being kicked, slapped and pushed. Due to wounds, mistreatment, malnutrition and debilitation he lost about forty pounds. At
the camp the prisoners were so crowded that there was not enough
room for them to lie down at night and stretch out. They were not
given winter clothing or shoes, and the food ration consisted of but
32 Lockhart & McClure, Literature,The Law of Obscenity and the Constitution,
38 MiNN. L. REV. 295, 391. (1938).
:3 See note 11 supra at 1514.
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two cups of millet per day. The mortality rate was so high that the
dead were not buried for days but were stacked up like cord wood in
the freezing weather.
The North Korean captor, Colonel Kim, demanded that the prisoners write scripts and record them for a propaganda broadcast. When
Fleming resisted this demand he was threatened with a forced march
to another prison camp which was 150 to 200 miles to the north. Testimony was introduced that the prisoner Fleming could not have survived such a march in his weakened condition and without winter
clothing or shoes in the freezing temperatures of the Korean winter.
Colonel Kim also demanded that Fleming lead a round table discussion with the prisoners on various Communist propaganda subjects.
Fleming used the preparation of the script for these discussions as a
bargaining factor in his demands for more food and better conditions.
The Communists rewarded his cooperation by increasing his food allowance from time to time. During the preparation of that script Kim
asked the prisoners to sign several appeals which were to be used for
propaganda purposes. The appeals called upon President Truman to
withdraw the United Nations troops from Korea, and upon the United
Nations troops to surrender to the Communists. Kim told Fleming that
unless he signed the appeals he would be sent to the "Caves."
The "Caves" were recesses in a hillside. They were wet and muddy
with little or no heating facilities. The prisoners lived in the muck
and mire like animals. The mortality rate in the indescribable filth
and privation of these holes in the ground was extremely high. To
dramatize the hideousness of his threat, Kim often took Fleming to see
the inhuman spectacle of the "Caves." On his first visit there Fleming
saw fourteen American prisoners. On his last only one remained. He
was lying in the mud, too sick to rise, and he informed Fleming that
all the rest had died, and that he too was dying. However of Fleming's own group, eight were sent to the caves and all survived but one.
Faced with the threat of the "Caves," Fleming signed the monstrous
propaganda appeals. But despite the example of Fleming, a field grade
officer and their leader in camp, the rest of the prisoners refused to
sign.
The defense claimed that under these facts his collaboration with
the enemy was the result of duress and coercion and that there was error in the instructions on duress, to wit:
"In order to excuse a criminal act on the ground of coercion,
compulsion or necessity, one must have acted under a well
grounded apprehension of immediate and impending death or
of immediate serious bodily harm."
The Court of Military Appeals, affirming a conviction of dismissal
and total forfeitures, held that the instruction as given was correct.
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The mere threat of the march north was insufficient; it would have
been a different situation if the prisoner had actually been started on
the march and had seen that he would not survive. As to the march
and to confinement in the "Caves" the court held that the prospect of
death was problematical and remote.
Quinn, C. J., concurring in the result states that a threat of confinement in the "Caves" did constitute a sufficient threat of, at least,
grievous bodily harm. But he went on to say:
"Raising a defense, however, does not mean that the court martial was bound to accept it. Other evidence shows that the accused had freely and materially cooperated with and helped the
enemy before he had heard or seen anything of the caves."
United States v. Fleming (No. 7943), 23 C.M.R. 7 (1957), affirming CM 377846, 19 C.M.R. 438.
The ingredients of the defense of duress, namely the threat of
death or serious bodily harm and the immediacy of that threat, have
long been established in the law. In the earliest days of our national
history we find a case similar to the one presently under consideration.
The case of Republica v. M'Carty1 in 1781 raised the question: what
will constitute the defense of duress in the case of a prisoner of war.
In that case the accused was indicted for high treason in levying war
and by joining the armies of the King of Great Britain. He had been
taken prisoner by the British in the Revolutionary War and remained
with their troops for a year. In answer to the defense of duress the
court held:
"In the eye of the law, nothing will excuse the act of joining
an enemy, but the fear of immediate death; ....But had the defendant enlisted merely from the fear of famishing, and with a
sincere intention to make his escape, the fear could not surely
always continue . . . . ,
Thus from our earliest history the existence of the defense of duress in the case of treason or defection by a prisoner of war was recognized, but also the requirement that the fear be of immediate death.
The court refused to accept the fear of delayed death by starvation
as a valid defense. In another early case, U.S. v. Vigol, 3 the defendant
was charged with high treason in levying war against the United
States. He was part of a mob that attacked and ransacked an excise
office in an attempt to obstruct the excise law. The defendant based his
claim of duress on the fact that the mob threatened to destroy his
home and his farm unless he joined them. The court in answering his
defense of duress defined it saying:
I1 L. Ed. (2 Dall.) 300 (1781).
2d at 301.
3 1 L. Ed. (2 Dall.) 409 (1795).
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" . . . the fear which the law recognizes as an excuse for the

perpetration of an offense, must proceed from an immediate
and actual danger, threatening the very life of the party. The apprehension of any loss of property, by waste or fire; or even
an apprehension '4of a slight or remote injury to the person, furnish no excuse."
This concept of the defense of duress in treason cases has survived
and is accepted as the general rule.5 The difficulty with this defense
in a prisoner of war case is that the imminent threat to life or limb
must be constant during the entire period of collaboration. 6 A general
threat or hostile attitude is too vague to extend to an entire period of
imprisonment, but the threat must be direct, definite and be repeated
or reenforced if its effectiveness has expired with the passage of time.
This position was questioned by an opinion rendered by a Judge
Advocate General of Civil War times He stated that Union prisoners
who served the Confederacy because suffering and privation endangered their lives were not to be considered deserters.
However, Gillars v. United States8 arising out of the Second
World War reaffirmed the original doctrine which requires a direct,
immediate and constant threat. The defendant in that case was convicted of treason for participating in psychological warfare against
the United States by appearing on propaganda radio programs for the
Nazis. The court in that case held that the threat of death or great
bodily harm must be immediate and constant. Threats made to other
prisoners and measures taken against them, as well as her fear of
being sent to a concentration camp, were held to be insufficient. Another similar case is that of Iva Ikuko D'Quino v. United StatesY
The defendant was convicted of treason for her part in the Japanese
broadcasts to the American troops which attempted to undermine their
morale. The court held that knowledge of atrocities committed upon
un-cooperative prisoners by her captors was insufficient as a defense.
"... this coercion or compulsion that will excuse a criminal act
must be present, immediate and impending, and of such a nature
as to induce a well grounded apprehension of death or serious
bodily injury if the act is not done."' 1
The same rule is applied in non-military cases. 1' In Shannon v.
4Id. at 410.

515 Am. JuR., Criminal Law §318 (1938). The definition from the Vigol case
is prefaced by the remark: "Even the crime of treason, if committed under
the fear of death, may, it seems be excused."
1 Bu Dicxc, CRIME §199 (1946).
6 Annot., 40 A.L.R. 2d 908 (1955).
7 WAR

DEPARTMENT

OPINION OF THE

OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, A DIGEST OF
ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMY 1076-1077 (1912).

JUDGE

8 182 F. 2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

9 192 F. 2d 338 (9th Cir. 1951).
10 Id. at 358.
L1 1 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW §384 (12th ed. 1932).
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U.S. 12 the defendants were convicted for conspiracy to kidnap and

hold for ransom. The kidnappers brought their victim to the house of
the defendants and at gunpoint forced the defendants to permit them
to use it as a hideout from the police for themselves and their victim.
The court found that the kidnappers were not present all the time,
and that there would have been an opportunity to call the police. Therefore since the threat was not immediate during the commission of some
of the overt acts, the defense of duress would not lie. The courts are
extremely strict in their requirement of immediacy in the threat before
13
the defense will be available.
The rule may seem harsh. The distinction between an immediate
threat and a mediate one appears, at first, to be an unduly academic
rule by which to judge the actions of a prisoner suffering from physical exhaustion and mental anguish. He may be validly aware that his
life is in jeopardy even though the threat may not have been direct or
immediate but delivered by innuendo or by the obvious attitude of the
captors coupled with the knowledge of the fate of other prisoners. But
the rule is nevertheless sound. If any resistance of our troops is to
be attained when they are captured and taken as prisoners of war it
must be required that resistance be up to the very face of death. If
anything less were required the necessity of resisting would be eliminated altogether. If the defense of duress could be based on the threat
of mediate death, as defense contended, the mere fact of being taken
prisoner would in most cases satisfy that standard. As said by one
court:
"We think that the citizen owing allegiance to the United States
must manifest a determination to resist commands and orders
until such time as he is faced with the alternative of immediate
injury or death. Were any other rule to be applied, traitors in
the enemy country would by that fact alone be shielded from
any requirement of resistance. The person claiming the defense
of coercion and duress must be14 the person whose resistance has
brought him to the last ditch.'

It seems sound to retain the strict rule in determining guilt, and
to consider all lesser circumstances in determining an appropriate sentence.
DAVID

A.

SCHUENKE

Conditional Sales: Date of Compulsory Resale When Goods Replevied.-Plaintiff sold two pieces of farm machinery to the defendants, the agreement being in the form of a conditional sales contract.
The vendees refused to make any payments on the $1,000.00 unpaid
1276 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935).
13 See R.I. Recreation Center Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 177 F.2d
603 (1st Cir. 1949).
14 192 F.2d 338, at 359 (9th Cir. 1951).

